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MICHEL FOUCAULT 
 
Michel Foucault is one of the most widely cited twentieth-century theorists in educational research. 
His most important contribution to this field has been in providing the resources for a sustained 
critique of the educational endeavor. Due to the scope of his work Ð which extends well beyond 
educational matters Ð and the radical consequences of his critical perspective, FoucaultÕs ideas are 
typically difficult to apply. To fully appreciate the insights Foucault has to offer, it is important to 
situate this work within his wider critique of the present. 
Tone and Scope 
Discipline and Punish, one of FoucaultÕs most famous books, contains a statement that indicates the tone 
and scope of his critical venture: With the rise of modernity the soul became the prison of the body. This 
modern soul has no vital or inextinguishable essence, but it is no illusion either. Unlike the soul of 
Christian theology, it was not born in sin, but was born from methods of punishment, supervision and 
constraint. It was a material product created through multiple techniques, extending across sites 
including the newly developed institutions of mass education.  
 
The consequence of this claim is to make freedom Ð a political project based on securing and 
protecting individual selves from the effects of dominant power Ð inherently problematic. For 
Foucault, the modern men, women and children that nineteenth-century campaigners, politicians and 
bureaucrats would seek to free, were already conditioned by forces much greater than themselves as 
the instruments of a wider political economy. Their souls, made from the resources of the institutions 
that had schooled them were already limited constructs, devised to suit the needs of government in the 
form of responsible and docile subjects. This, Foucault argues, is the dark underside of Western 
modernity, which through its commitments to liberalism and democracy would secure education and 
votes for all. Those newly established liberties were underwritten by multiple techniques that would 
instruct citizens to use their freedoms ÔappropriatelyÕ.  
 
These are monumental claims. Many other similarly iconoclastic statements may be found in 
FoucaultÕs work, which ranges from histories of madness, medicine and prisons, to the workings of 
power, knowledge, government and subjectivity. Foucault was, nevertheless, a meticulous and canny 
thinker, careful to avoid grand theories and epic claims. He preferred to look from the Ôbottom upÕ, 
believing that work that appears to view its subjects from above, or even from the outside, is 
impossible. This led him at times to appear non-committal, unwilling to declare his political and 
philosophical allegiances. FoucaultÕs work is often doggedly and sometimes frustratingly attendant to a 
form of meticulous unpicking, making it difficult to work out what Foucault was seeking to achieve in 
political terms. Whilst his political commitments were strong Ð indeed Foucault was no stranger to 
protest, direct action, arrest, deportation and even police brutality Ð Foucault has been criticized for 
refusing to declare what exactly he was arguing for, or what values guided his work. 
 
The reason for these refusals was FoucaultÕs suspicion of those very values, and what they were based 
upon. In particular, he suspected that the human subject, in whose interests ethical systems are often 
justified, is always a local construction. There is no universal human subject of history in whose name 
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we could speak. Foucault was able to show that many features of contemporary life are locally 
contingent, especially those features that we most take for granted. They have histories and thus, in 
principle at least, are open to change. Grander illusions, such as the presumed freedoms that modern 
education helped establish, are broken apart according to their histories. These ÔgenealogiesÕ, as 
Foucault called them, often muddy the origins of our most chershed ideals by situating these ideals 
within the banal transformations of everyday conduct from which they emerged. Here, and in many 
other respects, Foucault aligned himself with the thinking of Friedrich Nietzsche who argued that 
morality itself is just another social construct. The history of morality, like any other history, is marked 
by its grubby becomings. Moral meanings change through unexpected reversals; there is no internal or 
developmental consistency to the history of morality. Often the agent of change is trivial in 
appearance, to be located in some minor adjustment or other that has taken place in personal or social 
conduct. For Foucault, histories are seldom grand or progressive; they are grey and turbid. 
Power and Confession 
In educational research, FoucaultÕs work on power has been particularly influential. Here great care 
must be taken to avoid misunderstanding. Foucault emphasized the productivity of power, its 
generative potential. He was careful to avoid a repressive hypothesis where in education one might 
identify techniques as ÔbadÕ because they appear to limit the freedom of the student. Highly 
mechanistic devices such as examinations or tests, are frequently placed in this category. It is tempting 
to identify the most severe of these as devices that trample the interior of the child, and therefore 
conclude that they have no place in an educational context. FoucaultÕs counter-claim (which will 
outrage most educational pieties) is to suggest that these techniques may be central to the educational 
endeavor.  
 
Educational techniques such as those developed by nineteenth century schools (the first institutions of 
mass schooling), were able to shape individuality in such a way that those concerned were isolated 
from one another but open to the influence of government. Practices of division and exclusion (where 
the student is divided within, or divided from others) were combined with techniques that would 
enable the individual to turn him- or herself into a subject, techniques that would enable one to 
recognize externally defined traits within the self and then act upon them. As a material reality, the 
modern soul constructed here depends on a terrain of concepts within which it can be determined. It 
relies on external categories ranging from more general ideas Ð psyche, subjectivity, personality, 
consciousness etc. Ð to more child-specific notions Ð the troubled child, the child of promise, the 
borderline child, the resilient child and so on. The childÕs interior, in other words, was the product of 
external ideas and systems for locating those ideas within the self which, in turn, influenced how that 
self was formed. FoucaultÕs aim was to identify the material practices through which this occurred. 
 
In educational contexts, these material practices can be very intimate. Relations between teachers and 
students are sometimes close, where the latter are encouraged to confide in the former. Foucault 
explored these relations under the general rubric of Ôpastoral powerÕ, focusing in particular on 
confessional practices, where students may be encouraged to reveal and explore their inner thoughts 
and feelings. This might occur during periods of pastoral care, or through a whole-class task as basic as 
a reflective diary, where students are asked to explore the events of a weekend just gone by. Foucault 
argued that the obligation to confess, to reflect openly on oneÕs inner being, has become so deeply 
ingrained that we no longer see it as the effect of a power that constrains us. It seems as though the 
ÔtruthÕ that is lodged within only needs to surface, and that if it fails to do so, some sort of constraint, 
'Michel Foucault'. In D. Phillips (ed) Encyclopedia of Educational Theory and Philosophy. SAGE, 2014!
! 3 
or inhibition, is to blame for holding it in place and weighing it down. It is presumed, in other words, 
that confession frees, whilst ÔpowerÕ forces one to remain silent. This, Foucault suggested, is the Ôruse 
of confessionÕ. His point was to argue that power functions in the opposite direction, instructing 
individuals to produce truths about themselves, and rendering silence awkward. In educational 
contexts, students must learn to reflect upon their ÔinnerÕ selves using approved techniques and 
categories. The cumulative effect of observations like these is to suspect that educational relationships 
are never innocent; they are built from synthetic devices that have carefully fabricated effects. One 
might well associate some of the techniques described here with those favoured by progressive 
education, thus raising the suspicion that no pedagogy is purely benign, that no pedagogy can claim to 
be above the stratagems of power. From this perspective and taken as a whole, education becomes 
nothing less than a great artifice. Little that is ÔnaturalÕ or too banal to be without consequence 
remains. 
Theory and Strategy 
Foucault was a subversive thinker who set about challenging conventions. It is often assumed, for 
example, that knowledge arrives once power departs. If power remains, so the argument goes, its 
effects may contaminate knowledge. Foucault sought to show how the two are intimately linked: The 
human sciences were born from observations, and these required human samples. Social groups such 
as the newly gathered children of the nineteenth century mass school, formed ideal test subjects. They 
were already in the required form of measurable samples, having been temporarily held captive by the 
school. For the last two centuries at least, as children and then as adults, we have been examined at 
multiple sites. This has led to an overall inversion of visibility thanks to which previously ignored, 
unknown and marginalized groups as well as more general but minor phenomena, have been brought 
to prominence. The production of knowledge once prioritized the powered elite whose biographies 
were the only ones worth telling. Now the minor historical actors, their traits and biographies, have 
been opened up to inspection. Either directly visible through forms of optical surveillance or indirectly 
visible by means of the data trail that is left when passing through various agencies and institutions, the 
individual is captured within an array of documents, and becomes accessible thereby to the influence 
of power. 
 
From this perspective, power cannot corrupt knowledge because knowledge is already the product of 
power and is tied up within its operations. The overall effect is to deny exemption to any form of 
knowledge, or any science that claims the right to truth. Everything becomes subject to a form of 
skeptical, meticulous inquiry. The assumption here, which takes the form of a basic strategic-analytic 
choice, is to presume that everything is dangerous, since power is everywhere. This basic critical stance 
encourages the educational theorist to engage in a radical critique, targeting in particular those aspects 
of the educational endeavor that are seen as natural, or unproblematic, and have as a result been 
allowed to remain unchallenged.  
 
According to its dispersal, power is never entirely located in powerful institutions. It is never totally 
possessed as if it could be accumulated and concentrated, as if it could be brought to one place so as 
to be absent elsewhere. Equally, it would be a mistake to assume that power is governed by a single 
organizing principle, and to argue that an instance of power represents the wider interests of capital, 
patriarchy or the state. These are displacements, Foucault argues, by which we evade the real question 
of power in all its complex detail. 
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The difficulty with this position is that it implies the impossibility of denouncing power from the 
outside, simply because power is everywhere. Here Foucault adopted the stance of a hyperactive 
pessimist, suggesting that critique is at its most productive when it remains alert, avoiding the 
temptation (and potential satisfaction) of standing back to offer a global analysis, and then condemn. 
Foucault suspected that each global analysis only perpetuates an illusion of truth. These illusory truths 
can, moreover, have damaging effects. He claimed that revolutionary action that is based upon a single 
global diagnosis of power will almost inevitably reinvest some of the power-mechanisms that are to be 
overthrown. Here Foucault was particularly critical of revolutionary activities guided by a Marxist 
analysis of state power, and claimed, moreover, that socialist states reproduced in different guises the 
cruelties and inequities they sought to destroy. Radical, emancipatory theory had failed to anticipate 
these outcomes because of its tendency to reduce the complexities of power to simplistic relations of 
domination and exploitation.  
 
Against what Foucault saw as this tendency to neglect subtlety and ambiguity in the analysis of power, 
Foucault argued for a profusion of grey, meticulous and patiently constructed enquires into the 
multiple effects and modes of functioning that power takes. By implication, educational researchers 
who seek to adopt FoucaultÕs theoretical framework, are challenged to avoid passing judgment in their 
critique, which would be based on a normative ideal of the purpose of education. This anti-normative 
injunction will presumably enable researchers to interrogate educational concerns with greater caution 
and more critical insight.  
 
It is worth remembering, however, that FoucaultÕs invitation to exercise caution in analysis was not 
symptomatic of his preference for academic reserve. Rather, Foucault believed that a transformation in 
analytic techniques of the sort he promoted should be accompanied by experiments involving new 
forms of political conduct to which the insights gained through critique could be related. His was a 
radical project, sensitizing actors to the multiple effects of power and exploring the contingencies of 
government and subjectivity. Foucault promoted a form of intellectual labor that was never to be 
separated or abstracted from political praxis.  
 
Ansgar Allen, University of Sheffield 
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